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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Personal injuries were suffered by appellant who was 
driver of the middle car of a three car "chain" automobile 
accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Jury trial resulted in verdict finding driver of front 
car of chain, defendant-respondent, Elizabeth Hemingway, negli-
gent, but with such negligence not found to be proximate cause; 
found plaintiff-appellant neither negligent nor at fault; found 
driver of third car, defendant Clayton Querry, 100% at fault. 
Awarded verdict of $115,000.00 general damages and $38,000.00 
special damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Querry settled prior to trial, were not repre-
sented by counsel at trial, and are not believed to be parties 
to this appeal. 
Appellant seeks finding that Hemingway's negligence was 
a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law, and remand 
for trial solely on apportionment of fault between Hemingway 
and Querry, or as secondary alternative, that issues of liabi-
lity be remanded for trial, or as last alternative, for new 
trial. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident occured at 10:00 P.M., February 26, 1976, 
at 2910 South 7th East, Salt Lake County, Utah, a public high-
way. Although it was a winter night, the weather was clear, 
visibility good and the road dry. 
All vehicles were driving north, with the Hemingway ve-
hicle making a "U" turn from north to west, then south. 
No alcohol was involved. 
Plaintiff-appellant is Lisa Watters. She was 36 years 
of age. She was driving a 1974 Mercury Cougar from her home 
at 6734 South 1560 East, enroute to the Holy Cross Hospital, 
where she was due to start night shift work at 10:30 P.M. as 
a respiratory therapist. 
Defendant-respondent Elizabeth Hemingway was driving a 
1968 Chevrolet Impala. She was 17 years of age. Defendant-
respondent David E. Hemingway is her father. He is a party 
to the lawsuit only because of his statutory liability due to 
his being signatory on her driver's license. In this brief, 
reference to "Hemingway" shall be to Elizabeth Hemingway. 
She had just dropped off Mike Stewart, who was a friend of her 
brother, David, at his home on Elgin Avenue east of 7th East. 
Elgin Avenue is at 3000 South. As remaining passengers, she 
had her brother, David Ernest Hemingway, and his friend, Randall 
Rigdon. All were students at Granite High School, with Miss 
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Miss Hemingway resided at 436 East 4335 South. She in-
tended to go south on 7th East from Elgin Avenue in order to 
drop off Randall Rigdon who resided southwest from there. 
Defendant Clayton N. Querry was driver of the third car. 
He was 16 at the time of the accident. Jean C. Querry, his 
mother, is not a party to the action although named in the 
pleadings, because it was first thought that she was signatory 
to his driver's license. She has since been released from the 
case. Defendant Charles L. Querry, Clayton's father, was signa-
tory to his license and so is a party due to his statutory 
liability as such signatory. All reference herein to "Querry" 
will be to Clayton Querry. Clayton had been to an L.D.S. Ward 
basketball game and was on his way home. He was accompanied 
by a friend, Scott Pederson. Clayton resided at 2773 Adams 
Street. He was using 7th East to get to 27th South where he 
intended to make a left turn to the west. Clayton did not 
testify at the second trial, being onan L.D.S. Mission, so 
his testimony from the first trial was read into the record. 
The issue is as to proximate cause of Hemingway. In view 
of Miss Hemingway's favorable jury verdict, she is entitled to 
favorable factual interpretation. Accordingly, most facts 
stated will be from testimony of her and her passengers. Even 
so, appellant claims that the facts are such that the jury was 
led into error by errors in law of the trial court and will 
submit facts supporting this claim of Hemingway's fault. 
-3-
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To ask the court to set aside a jury verdict and the trial 
court's denial of an NOV motion on the basis that the facts 
are adequate to show fault as a matter of law requires a 
detailed exposition-of the facts. 
The case was tried and appealed once before, reported 
in 588 P2d 702. In that opinion, most of the essential facts 
were synthesized as follows: 
"At about 10:00 P.M. on February 26, 1976, defendant 
Elizabeth Hemingway turned her car north onto 7th 
East Street from Elgin Avenue (:about 2950 South in 
Salt Lake City). She accelerated to the speed of 
traffic flow (about 50 m.p.h.) while she was moving 
to her left from the extreme outside (easterly) lane 
to the inside (against the highway divider) lane. 
After thus proceeding northward about 600 feet to 
a break in the divider, she made a sudden stop to 
await an opportunity to make a left turn. Plaintiff 
Watters, immediately following Hemingway, managed to 
stop without contact. But the next following car, 
whose driver, defendant Clayton Querry, was admittedly 
inattentive, ran into the back of plaintiff Watters' 
car resulting in injury to plaintiff and damage to 
her car. , 
"The difficulty with the instruction about which plain-
tiff complains is that, as applied to the instant situa-
tion, it would seem to exculpate defendant Hemingway 
(who created a dangerous situation) if it is found 
that the defendant Querry (the later actor) was negli-
gent, whether or not the latter's conduct was foresee-
able. If the principle of law just discussed is properly 
applied to the evidence in this case, it appears to us 
that there is a legitimate question as to whether a 
jury could reasonably find that defendant Hemingway, 
in making the alleged abrupt stop, should have foreseen 
that, in traffic such as there was on that highway, 
some momentarily inattentive driver following her would 
would not be able to react and brake quick enough to 
avoid collision with her car or the car behind hers. 
The instructions should have presented that problem 
to the jury as contended by the plaintiff." 
-4-
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It should be noted that the dissent was based on a mis-
apprehension of fact. That is, it is based on Miss Hemingway 
entering the roadway going slower than Watters and continuing 
to move slowly until she stopped for the turn. Actually, Miss 
Hemingway accellerated, which led following traffic to think 
she was moving into traffic flow. Miss Hemingway spoke for 
herself on the point as follows: 
"As I pulled on into lane 2 [next to inside lane], I 
was probably going from 30-35 and 35 as I changed lanes 
into lane one and proceed there at 35 until I braked, 
and I don't know how much I slowed down with that 
braking motion, but I did accelerate up to no more 
than 35 m.p.h. and then I proceed to slow back down 
again as I saw this car approach and pass that break 
in the island as I turned." [Emphasis added] (Tr. 
P202 I L6-13} 
Miss Hemingway's brother, David, agreed testifying that 
in his opinion she reached a speed of 40 m.p.h. between the two 
times she braked. ( Tr • P 2 6 5 , Ll - 8 } 
"Q. In your testimony today, your testimony is that she 
got up and accelerated, driving down the island to 
about 40 m.p.h. 
A. Yes. 
Q. She accelerated promptly, didn't she, when she got 
into that high speed lane? She moved right up clos~ 
to the traffic, didn't she? 
A. Yes. 
Q •••• But when she started to slow down she was about 
100 feet from the end of the island? 
A. From the break in the island, yes. 
Q. And going about 40 at the time? 
A. Uh-huh." (David Hemingway's testimony, Tr. P268, 
L28-P269, Lll) 
-5-
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The distances involved were 2,080 feet from Elgin Avenue 
south to 33rd South, and 360 feet more from Elgin Avenue north 
to the break in the traffic divider where the accident occurred. 
Assuming conservatively that Miss Hemingway had an average 
speed of 25 m.p.h. from her entry onto 7th East until her stop, 
she would have traveled the distance in 10 seconds. 
As to whether approaching northbound traffic would be 
obstructed by her stopping, she denied this saying that she 
looked south from Elgin Avenue, saw traffic at 33rd South, saw 
the light turn green for the traffic to start, with no traffic 
in between and so knew that she had plenty of time. (Tr. P201, 
13-10; P224, Ll0-P225, LS) She denied coming to a complete 
stop, which would have added to her time, before she made the 
turn. For traffic to have reached her from 33rd South in the 
same 10 seconds covering 2,440 feet, it would have had to have 
been traveling at 160 m.p.h. 
This tends to confirm her alternate version of the facts 
in which she admitted that she usually went south about 100 
feet to a break in the island, but this time turned north 
because oncoming traffic was close enough that one of the 
boys in the car asked her not to go south. (Tr. P211, L4-
P213, Ll4) 
When Miss Hemingway moved into the inside lane with 
traffic close enough to keep her from making the jog to the 
south as was her custom, she testified the jog took only 3 to 
-6-
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5 seconds. (Tr. P213, L6-14) When she moved from lane two to 
lane one, she glanced back, saw approaching traffic in her rear-
view mirror, but made no estimate of its distance from her. 
(Tr. P202, Ll4-29; P227, Ll-16) 
What did Miss Hemingway do then after she entered the 
high speed inside lane? She has given two versions. In her 
most recent version, she traveled slowly looking for the end 
of the island. (Tr. P203, L2-14) 
In her first two versions, at deposition and first trial, 
as quoted above, rather than going slowly, she accelerated 
until she got to the island and then slowed abruptly. The 
former testimony was summarized at trial as follows: 
and 
"Q. Do you have an estimate as to how·fast you were 
traveling when you made the lane change? 
A. I said 40, but I have gone 40 on the road before 
and I know now that there wouldn't be any way I could 
be able to stop if I was going 40. So I am going to 
say now about 30 to 35. 
Q. ... You didn't know where the break in the island 
was, did you? 
A. No~ sir. II (Tr. P216, Ll7-29) 
During the entire time when traveling in the inside lane 
stopping, Miss Hemingway made no effort to check to see 
how close following traffic was to her {Tr. P227, Ll-6), 
notwithstanding that she knew it was too close for her to have 
cut south when ~n,t~ing seventh east,._- and would have to have come 
closer to her while she accelerated entering the roadway. 
-7-
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When did she next look? After she heard the impact. 
(Tr. P217, L9-10; P227, Ll-6) Whether she stopped prior to 
making her turn or not is again a subject on which she gave 
differing testimony, a major factor on ~he degree to which she 
obstructed traffic. As indicated above, in her deposition, she 
clearly remembered the fact of her stopping, using her recol-
lection that she did in fact stop to arrive at her estimate as 
to her maximum speed while in lane one. At trial, however, 
she testified twice that she slowed down, timed the car going 
south, and swung "very smooth" through her U-turn after it 
passed without her needing to slow below 5 to 10 m.p.h. and not 
stopping at all. {Tr. P203, L27-P204, Ll2; P208, L26-P209, L3) 
De.spite this precise detail, she gave, she admi ttted on cross-
examination that she didn't know whether that fact situation 
ever happened at all, admitting that she might very well have 
come to a complete stop for southbound traffic to approach, 
(Tr. P223, L26-P224, L9) in which case her testimony as to 
her slow, smooth timed turn would have to be imagination. 
Either way, she testified that she could have stopped being an 
obstruction simply by continuing or starting north again, rather 
than insisting on remaining in position to turn. (Tr. P227, 
Ll2-P22 8, L22) 
The look Miss Hemingway made was when she heard the col-
lision. This is when she had just conunenced her turn, she 
stating, "As I rounded the corner, I heard the crash. " (Tr· 
P217, L9-10; P227, Ll-6) 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again, there is conflict in her testimony in a vital area--
her awareness at the time of being in the right or in the wrong. 
At the second trial, Miss Hemingway testified that she 
felt she had done nothing wrong and didn't know that her turn 
was illegal. (Tr. P205, Ll9-26; P208, L9-16-P209, Lll-12) 
This was in conflict with her previous testimony in her 
deposition. (Refusal of admission of this testimony was a 
primary point in the first appeal, and· the evidence was received 
at the second trial.) She admitted that immediately on getting 
home on the night of the accident, she went to the home of an 
older friend to talk to her about the accident and at that time 
said, "And I just told her that I felt really bad because I 
felt that I was the cause of an accident." (Tr. P220, Ll-20) 
Miss Hemingway also testified that at the time the acci-
dent occurred, she knew the turn was illegal. (Tr. P220, 
L21-P221, Ll) Her own passenger, Randy Rigdon testified that 
immediately after the accident there was talk between the three 
people in the Hemingway car, and that she felt badly because 
she had caused an accident making an illegal turn. It was 
Rigdon's opinion that Miss Hemingway had caused the accident. 
In fact, the next day, through pure happenstance, the small 
world department, he mentione,d to a friend of his, Clayton 
Querry, that he had been in a car that had caused an accident 
the night before, to find to his amazement that Clayton was 
the driver of one of the cars involved in that accident. (Tr. 
P81, L2~23;P82, L30-P84,Lll) 
-9-
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11 Q .... 'You know Clayton Querry a little, don't you?' 
A. 'Yes.' 
Q. 'All right. Do you remember mentioning to him one 
morning in February the night before you had been in 
a car that had caused an accident and it turned out 
to be a small world because he was in the car that 
did the hitting?' 
A. 'Oh yes, I think so.' 
Q. 'Do you recall if Liz Hemingway had her left-turn 
signal on when she was stopped at the end of the island.' 
A. I don't. 11 (Tr. P81, Ll8-27) 
Other than that chance comment, Miss Hemingway might never have 
been found as she left the accident scene without identifying 
herself. 
"Q. Did anybody say anything .between you and Liz and 
her brother about having caused the accident by having · 
been stopped? 
A. I think we talked about it, yes. 
Q. Now tell as well as you can recall what this talk was. 
A. Well, we was just kind of like talking back and forth 
to each other. I think one of us mentioned that--! don't 
know if the law--you can't make a turn in that kind of a 
dip. 
Q. You can't make a U-turn? 
A. Where there ain't no--
Q. Storage lane? 
A .. Yes. 
Q. Do you know who it was who said that? 
A. One of us did, maybe it was me. 
Q. Did Liz say anything to indicate that she felt bad 
about the accident? 
A. Yes. 11 (Tr. P83, L21-P84, Lll) 
-10-
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Rigdon also confirmed Miss Hemingway and Mrs. Watters that 
the impact between Watters and Querry happened just as Miss 
Hemingway's turn was starting. {Tr. P80, L4-22) 
On that point, Watters had testified that as she was 
stopping, she saw the lights of the Querry car closing behind 
her and knew she was "in for it," but she felt trapped not being 
able to change lanes due to other traffic. She tried to acceler-
ate forward the instant that Hemingway commenced her turn. 
Watters was unsure as to whether she was still stopped or start-
ing at the time of the impact. {Tr. Pll3, L24-Pll5, L2; Pl74, 
Ll3-23) 
In Watters' opinion, Miss Hemingway was stopped for a 
very short time {Tr. Pl53, Ll0-;7), for a period of probably 
less than 5 seconds (Tr. Pl59, L24-Pl60, LS), and that the 
accident happened immedately after she (Watters) had stopped. 
{Tr. PlS 5, L2-9) . 
Mr. Rigdon estimated Hemingway's stopped time at 5 seconds, 
10 at most. (Tr. P79, L7) 
It should be noted that the jury also apparently accepted 
Watters' verson of the facts as supported by evidence from other 
witnesses,as it found her entirely free of negligence and fault. 
The testimony of Mr. Querry as read into the record was 
that he glanced over to say something to his companion, the com-
panion said, "Look out," Querry looked up, saw the Watters' car 
in the act of stopping, but not stopped, started to stop himself 
and ran into the rear of the Watters' car. Querry estimated his 
-11-
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speed at maybe 5 m.p.h. less than the 40 m.p.h. he had been 
traveling at. On this, Querry put himself too much at fault. 
The investigating officer, Trooper LeCours, with 12 years' ex-
perience, said that the rather modest damage to the two vehicles 
was such that the speed differential between Watters and Querry 
was only 5 to 10 m.p.h. He dismissed the accident as a "fender-
bender," but had seen severe injuries from such minor accidents 
on occasion, depending on luck. (Tr. P22,:Ll-27) LeCours esti-
mated Watters' speed at the time of impact at 5 to 10 m.p.h. and 
Querry's at 10 to 15 m.p.h., based in part on Watter's statement 
at the accident scene that she thought she had managed to start 
forward when she was hit. (Tr. P26, L2-7) 
Trooper LeCours was confirmed in the 10 m.p.h. impact speed 
differential between Watters and Querry by Watters' expert wit-
ness, David Lord. (Tr. P46, Ll6-P48, Ll3) 
The inunediacy of Querry's approach and collision in rela-
tionship to Miss Hemingway stopping and turning was clear. As 
Miss Hemingway's own expert, Captain Ed Pitcher, U.H.P., agreed: 
"Q. Now with that, everything happens one right after 
the other, doesn't it? 
A. Most likely so, yes. 
Q. Its all one continuous chain, isn't it; the first stop, 
second stop, the third car? 
A. Its all interrelated, yes. 
Q. Completely interrelated, isn't it? 
A. Yes. " ( Tr. P303, L23 -P304, L2) 
-12-
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The only other factual point that needs to be covered is 
as to the emergency causing Miss Hemingway to do what she did. 
She stated this as follows: 
"Q. (by Mr. King) Do you recall during your deposition 
when I asked you why did you make this U-turn? 
'Answer: I was short on time.' 
Q. If it had not been for that, you would have gone and 
made the turn at some other place, wouldn't you? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. What was the hurry? 
A. I guess I was a little put out that my brother asked 
me to take his friends home and it was late. I don't 
know what I had done that evening, but I feel that I was 
just a little short on time and patience, probably with 
him." (Tr. P222, L23-P223, L3) 
Certain facts are in agreement, between appellant and re-
spondent,which include the vital ones: 
1. Miss Hemingway, through her attorney, stipulated that 
her left turn was in violation of traffic code. 46-6-63.10 UCA. 
2. Miss Hemingway knew, as she drove, slowed, and, prd:>-
ably, stopped in lane one, that there was traffic following 
behind her. 
3. Miss Hemingway made no effort to determine how close 
the traffic was. 
4. Watters reacted promptly and, when Hemingway's stop 
became apparent, Watters started to stop. 
5. Querry started braking before Watters was fully stopped. 
6. The impact between Querry and Watters occurred immedi-
ately after Hemingway started her turn. 
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Facts of trial are part of the facts of the total case on 
review. At trial, both parties submitted their proposed instruc-
tions at the start of the trial which was on a Wednesday morning, 
the trial concluding the following Tuesday night. The court did 
not discuss these proposals, nor its proposed instructions,with 
counsel until near the end of the trial. It then advised counsel 
it did not choose to discuss the instructions with them, as the 
work of the case was hard enough, and it did not want to spend 
an additional "hour being harangued by counsel" in chambers on 
the law. The court also indicated that it wanted the exceptions 
to be taken after the jury was instructed and after the judge 
had left the bench. 
These details are incorporated herein by reference to Annex 
1, the affidavit of appellant's counse~,which the court reviewed 
f 
at the NOV Motion. The trial court was not lacking in candor, 
and after commenting that counsel was asking the court for a stipu-
lation which the court was not going to give, the court still 
agreed the facts as stated in the affidavit were substantially 
accurate. (Tr. P324, L30-P25, L9) 
As a result of the court's approach to the instructions, 
appellant's requested instructions 17 and 17a which set out 
appellant's theory of liability on the part of Hemingway of 
improper lookout and obstructing highway were not submitted to 
the jury, al though not disapproved, .so that the instructions 
to the jury do not have a single word in them about any duty of 
lookout on the part of Hemingway, or any duty on her part not to 
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obstruct the roadway. Similarly, the instructions have three 
different and conflicting definitions on proximate cause, while 
appellant's proposal on proximate cause which was long but care-
fully tailored to the fact situation was not given, without being 
approved or disapproved, but simply ignored. Due to this, in the 
factual context of the trial, the jury had no law before it on 
which to find Miss Hemingway negligent based on lookout or traffic 
obstruction, nor the relationship of these acts to her being a 
proximate cause of the accident. 
POINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, RESPONDENT WAS A 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Instruction 24 (Annex 6) shows the kind of difficulty a 
trial court can have in applying proximate cause. It says that 
the jury can find Hemingway liable to Watters if the accident 
happened in the "sequence of events which might reasonably be 
expected to follow the actions of Elizabeth Hemingway " 
This instruction is unfair to Hemingway because liability 
is the ultimate test and proximate cause, as a matter of law 
imposing legal liability, cannot be laid on acts which are not 
wrongful and the instruction is not limited to wrongful acts. 
Similarly, the court erred in not defining, to protect Watters, 
either here or at any other part of the instructions, the acts 
of Hemingway that Watters claimed to be the wrongful acts from 
which proximate cause arose. 
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To determine what the wrongful acts of Miss Hemingway 
were, resort to the basic law is appropriate. Once those acts 
are defined, determination can be made if their ongoing effect 
was a proximate cause of the accident. 
Appellant cannot seek to hold Hemingway to duties that 
she did not claim at trial. Appellant claimed three such 
duties as specified in her proposed instruction 17. 
"Plaintiff claims that Elizabeth Hemingway was negli-
gent because she obstructed a moving lane of traffic. 
Plaintiff claims that this negligence was of three 
types which are: (1) that she attempted an illegal 
left turn thereby blocking arterial traffic; (2) 
that she kept an improper look-out so that she failed 
to clear the road as oncoming traffic approached; 
(3) that she failed to drive as a reasonable driver 
would have and should have under the existing circum-
stances." (Annex 7) 
(Neither this instruction, nor any other instruction deal-
ing with Miss Hemingway's duties to keep a look-out and not to 
obstruct traffic, went to the jury.) 
As stated by Dean Prosser, Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed. 
§45, p. 289: 
"PROXIMATE CAUSE--FUNCTIONS OF COURT AND JURY. (1) 
The determination of any question of duty, that is, 
whether the defendant stands in such a relationship 
to the plaintiff that the law will impose on him any 
obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of 
plaintiff, is one of law, and is never for the jury." 
The court did not assume this responsibility. It submitted 
the case to the jury with no definition of Miss Hemingway's 
duties. As proximate cause traces from breach of a duty, the 
jury had no basis, if it followed the instructions, to do other 
than release her on the issue of proximate cause. 
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On the facts, the Watters' car was close behind Miss 
Hemingway when Hemingway started to stop. This is not in 
dispute. Miss Hemingway's own proposed instruction, incor-
porated as instruction 25 of the court's instructions, claimed 
that Watters followed Miss Hemingway too closely. 
In this situation the lead car had control. A glance 
into her rearview mirror was all that was required of Miss 
Hemingway. It was not a situation where one might reasonably 
stop, as in a residential neighborhood. This was the most 
heavily traveled and highest speed street in Salt Lake County, 
eastof State Street. Miss Hemingway's acts were not accidental, 
as overlooking a stop sign might be. They were intentional. 
What she did was done because she chose to do it. There was 
no crisis created by others forcing her to act without thought. 
Are the duties claimed by Watters against Hemingway appro-
priate? The answer to this question lies in the concept of 
foreseeability, and that lies in the fruits of the exercise of 
thelegal duty to think. 
Palsgraff v. Long Island Railway, 162 NE 99, 59 ALR 1253 
(NY, 1928), deserves its prominent place in the lexicon of 
proximate cause. The important aspect of that case applies 
with equal force here. Justice Cardozo found that the railroad 
guards in pushing and pulling the passenger onto the train had 
no reason to foresee that the newspaper wrapped package he 
carried contained explosive fireworks. If they had thought 
and considered the matter, their actions would have been the 
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same because they were simply assisting a passenger with no 
known risk of harm. Accordingly, they breached no duty to the 
passenger at a remote part of the railway platform who was in-
jured when the explosion of the fireworks contained in the 
package knocked the heavy scales orito her. 
Justice Cardozo reasoned that one has a duty to avoid con-
duct which is foreseeably dangerous to another. Duties do not 
exist "in the air" as he put it, but must anchor to something 
tangible. As no risk was to be anticipated, no duty to avoid 
risk arose. As no duty arose, the question of proximate cause 
never arose. Proximate cause as used in law cases is a legal 
term. It means legal responsibility for the consequencesof a 
negligent act. As there was no negligent act, hence no duty 
breached, he concluded that the issue of proximate cause was 
"foreign to the case before us," and put plaintiff out of court. 
However, his rationale puts Miss Hemingway in court. 
Justice Cardozo's thinking is much similar to Dean Presser's. 
It is for the court to determine duties. A jury can weigh facts 
but legal concepts--be·cause they are law--is beyond them, and 
for the courts. These legal determinations arise as appropriate 
from the facts of the case. 
One of the clearest expressions of the duty of the primary 
actor is a 97 year old English case which is still cited and 
used as a basis for the present English rule~ Relating the 
relationship of an act and its legal effect to legal cause, 
the cipin ion states : 
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" That whenever one person is by circumstances placed 
in such a position in regard to another that everyone of 
ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that 
if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own con-
duct in regard to those circumstances, he would cause 
danger of injury to the person or property of others, a 
duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such 
danger." Kevin v. Pender, 11 QBD 503 (1883), Brett, 
MR. as quoted and explained at Torts, 3d Ed., p. 163-165, 
Schulman, James & Grey, 1976. 
The English opinion goes to the heart of it, 
"If everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at 
once recognize . . . . " 
To approach the concept of what is reasonable conduct by 
asking one to think has a nice commonsense clarity. It also 
ties in with Prosser and Palsgraff. Think--is there a risk--
act accordingly. It helps us determine what our "reasonable 
man" should do. 
The foregoing citations have not been for the purpose of 
rhetoric, but function. Applying them to Miss Hemingway's 
conduct, at the very least, she had a duty to think, to ask 
herself what would happen if she created an embolism in the 
artery? The thought would have led to the look, the look would 
have led to the knowledge of danger --if -she didn't already have 
that knowledge. It is always· possible that Miss Hemingway is 
of the type who simply does what they want in traffic and lets 
others brake as they will. 
Miss Hemingway had to know that traffic was behind her be-
cause she had seen it. She had to know that she had not reached 
the flow speed, which customarily is around the speed limit, so 
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that as she traveled the 360 feet from Elgin Avenue to the end 
of the island, she had to assume traffic was closing on her. 
These were things she admits she knew. There is no question on 
them. Knowing that traffic was approaching, she had the duty 
to determine if what she wanted to do would expose others to 
a risk of harm or not. ;rf so, her duty was to choose a safer 
course. 
Miss Hemingway's duties are self-defining on analysis of 
the facts. As requested by Watters at trial, they were to keep 
an adequate look-out and not to create a hazard by blocking the 
traffic lane. 
The original opinion of the Utah Supreme Court is clear on 
.. this. It refers repeatedly to Miss Hemingway's "stop, 11 and 
makes only passing reference to the left turn. It was the stop, 
whose obstructive effects were still existing, which caused 
the collision. Duty, breach, and resulting harm are, as stated 
by Miss Hemingway's own expert, "completely interrelated." 
(Tr. P303, L23-P304, L2) 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, Miss Hemingway is part of 
proximate cause unless the later act of Querry releases her. 
That is the next point. 
POINT II. 
THE LATER ACTOR'S CONDUCT WAS NOT OF 
SUCH CHARACTER AS TO RELIEVE THE FIRST 
ACTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROXIMATE 
CAUSE. 
The most recent case in point, Jensen v. Mountain States 
Tel & Tel. Co. et al., Utah, 16417, filed April 15, 1980, draws 
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a fine distinction which is highly applicable to the case at bar. 
There, the telephone company doing work in an intersection, 
put out excellent warnings of the presence of its van in the 
intersection. Should any person have driven into the van, they 
would probably have been sole proximate cause of the accident as 
not being able to see and avoid the van was not probable. How-
ever, the case involved two cars which collided with each other 
trying to work through the blind area created by the van's pre-
sence. It was foreseeable by the telephone company that in try-
ing to get through a crowded intersection, such accidents might 
occur. The telephone company had made no provision, such as a 
flagman, to assist traffic in getting by the hazard it had created 
In an analysis very similar to that in Palsgraff, the court 
reversed a non-suit in favor of the telephone company, remanding 
for trial because of foreseeability of the hazard that produced 
the accident as a jury question. The duty to foresee was found 
as a matter of law by the appellate court's review of the facts. 
This test of duty arising from foreseeability is precisely 
the reason that Miss Hemingway had duties. 
An important part of Jensen, supra, as applied to this case, 
is its rejection of the argument that regardless of the fault of 
the telephone company, the later act of the automobile drivers 
was an intervening act which superceded the negligence of the 
company, thereby insuJating that negligence from being a sub-
stantial factor in causing the collision. 
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Rejecting the argument that a later independent act of negli-
gence breaks the chain of proximate cause, the court quoted :.i: 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 U2d 143, 263 P2d 287, which 
held that a later act of negligence would be the sole proximate 
cause only when it "was so unusual, so out of the ordinary, so 
unforeseeable as to be unanticipatable from a legal point Of View. II 
The Jensen opinion then went on to cite the Restatement o.f 
the Law of 'Ibrts with approval which put strong duties on the 
original wrongful actor (contra to what was done by the trial 
court in the case at bar), setting up three situations in which 
an independent later negligent act does not relieve the original 
actor. These being, that a later actor might reasonably act as 
the injured party did; that the later act would not be regarded 
as highly extraordinary; or that the later act was a normal but 
negligent response to the situation and the manner in which it 
was done was not extraordinarily negligent. The basis stated in 
the Restatement and as approved by the court was that: 
"The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability 
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later 
negligence of another concurs to cause injury, if the 
later act were a legally foreseeable event." [Emphasis 
not added] 
There is nothing in the fact situation which makes Querry's 
conduct in any way 11 extraordinarily negligent." 
The sequence of time and distance was too short. If 
Querry had had such time and distance "after being charged with 
knowledge of the hazard," as stated in Hillyard, supra, then his 
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act could be a later intervening act and sole proximate cause. 
However, without any dispute in the evidence, he was in act of 
stopping before Watters had completed her stop. There could 
not have been a delay in his reaction and braking of more than 
two or three seconds. This was ordinary negligence, if negli-
gence at all. 
In accord, Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U2d 435, 326 P2d 722, (Court 
has power to analyze difficult fact situation), King v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 117 U 40, 12 P2d 692 (if evidence untenable, ver-
dict can be modified). 
While last clear chance and the extraordinary act of negli-
gence of a later actor that breaks the chain of proximate cause 
are not judicially equated as being the same, their elements 
are remarkably similar, and last clear chance is helpful in de-
fining that act which releases an earlier wrongdoer from liability. 
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 44 U 100, 138 P 
1185 (1914), is a well respected case on that, requiring the 
later actor to be in a position where he knew or should have 
known as a matter of law of a hazard in front of him; that after 
he is charged with that knowledge, and he has a clear opportunity 
to avoid an accident, yet proceeds and causes the accident, 
then and only then, he has the last clear chance. 
A series of Utah cases considering the later independent 
actor is submitted by appellant as being all in accord as a 
matter of law, Querry's act was not the sole proximate cause 
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of appellant's injuries although it was one of the proximate 
causes. 
Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 U2d 278, 365 P2d 788: 
"An injury due to neglect of duty on the part of a 
defendant cannot be avoided because a similar duty 
rested upon another who violated his duty. One, in 
such manner, cannot escape the consequences of his 
own act." 
Nyman v. Cedar Cit_y, 12 U2d 45, 361 P2d 1114; 
Martin v. Stevens, 121 U 484, 243 P2d 747; 
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 U2d 400, 346 P2d 711; 
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 U2d 379, 366 P2d 989; 
Taylor v. Jdmson,, 18 U2d 16, 414 P2d 575. 
In sum, the principle for which appellant claims that 
Hemingway is liable as a matter of law is stated in relation to 
the amount of a verdict but appropriate all the same in Bodon 
v. Suhrmann,8 U2d 42, 327 P2d 826: 
"In such instances, the court exercises its inherent 
supervisory powers over jury verdicts, which derive from 
their duty to see that justice is done; and make correc-
tive orders necessary for the purpose. This is done by 
the trial court, or upon its failure to do so, by this 
court on appeal. " 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY NOT HAVING HER 
THEORY OF THE CASE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
Error is prejudicial when it is substantial and a reason-
able likelihood exists that in the absence of the error, the 
result would have been different. Ortega v. Thomas, 14 U2d 296, 
383 P2d 406. 
A party is entitled to have his theory of the case sub-
mitted to the jury and the failure to do so is prejudicial 
error. Morrison v. Perry, 104 U 151,140 P2d 772; State v. 
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Va!~~.' November, 1979, #15920, Utah. 
In this case, respondent's theory of appellant's negligence 
was submitted to the jury as instruction 25. 
Appellant's theory as to the forms of negligence of respon-
dent was not submitted to the jury. These were included in instru 
tion 17 of appellant's request setting forth the kinds of negli-
gent acts claimed, and 17a defining the terms used in 17 {Annexes 
7 and 8). 
The facts surrounding the rejection of the instructions by 
the court are set forth in counsel's affidavit, Annex 1. The 
regretable thing is that the rejection was not based on the 
merits of the proposed instructions but on the fact that appel-
lant had not requested them in the first trial. 
These instructions were proper statements of the law, based 1 
on the evidence before the jury. The court's refusal to give 
them denied appellant's vital theory of proximate cause from 
going to the jury, because it was improper look-out and the 
obstruction of traffic that were the duties whose breach con-
tinued into the accident, whereas the left turn was a fait 
accompli before the accident occurred. 
Not only did the trial court refuse to allow appellant to 
improve her thinking from trial to trial, it simply declined to 
revise the instructions from the previous trial even though it 
had critized those instructions as "poor." The court stated: 
"The Court: For better or worse--! don't take credit for 
their authorship or for their accuracy or for their ... · 
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Mr. King: Freedom from error. One last matter. 
The Court: I will give Judge Snow all the credit for 
fhese instructions." (Tr. 313, L30-P314, L4) 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED BOTH IN TWICE INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT A LATER ACT OF NEGLIGENCE WAS 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, AND IN OVERLOOKING 
THE MANDATE ·op THE SUPREME COURT ON THAT 
POINT. 
"D. By 'proximate cause' is meant that cause which in a 
natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, 
produced the injury and without which the injury would 
not have occurred." [Emphasis added] Instruction 7D 
(Annex 2) 
This is the same concept as that given by the court at 
the first trial on which reversal was based, iee., a later act 
of negligence breaks the chain of causation. Accordingly, the 
court's previous holding in this case is submitted as being 
dispositive. 
Instructions are to be tailored to the fact situation. 
Mackey v. Harvey, 572 P2d 382 (Utah, 1977), Lund v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 12 U2d 268, 272; 365 P2d 633; and if not and mis-
leading, reversal is appropriate. Watters v. Querry, 588 P2d 
702 (Utah, 1978); Ortega v. Thomas, 14 U2d 296, 383 P2d 406. 
Appellant had submitted a detailed instruction on proxi-
mate cause tailored to the facts, designed to accomodate situa-
tions in which a later negligent driver was and was not an in-
dependent new cause adequate to break the existing chain of 
proximate cause. This is attached as Annex 9. 
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This instruction was submitted as being identical to the 
court's instruction 7 through sections A, Band C, and.simply 
inserted in D a longer more appropriate proximate cause clause. 
As indicated, this was rejected by the court without considera-
tion of its merit because the court relied on the first trial 
instructions. 
Its instruction 17 (Annex 3) dealt with concurring causes 
of an accident. "Concurring" was the wrong term as that is at 
the same time, and here the acts were successive. The instruc-
tion thus was inappropriate. 
Worse, it compounded the erroneous message of instruction 
7 by stating again that a proximate cause is "unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause." Mr. Querry was exactly that--an 
efficient intervening cause. What he was not was an extra-
ordinarily negligent driver. No saving definition was given as 
to the court's terms, "efficient," and "intervening." 
The final instruction on proximate cause given by the trial 
court, instruction 24, is attached as Annex 6. It is the instruc-
tion previously considered by the Utah Supreme Court with the 
last sentence deleted. It fails to cure the error and confusion 
of the other two instructions. Calahan v. Wood, 24 U2d 8, 
465 P2d 169. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING COUNSEL TO 
SEE, CONSIDER AND TAKE EXCEPTION TO, THE 
COURT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS. 
The facts are covered in Annex 1. 
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All this occurred, it is submitted, because the require-
ments of Rule 51, URCP, were not complied with, it requiring 
as a minimum that exceptions be taken in the presence of the 
court before the jury is instructed so that the court can 
correct oversights and mistakes before the act, usually irre-
trievable, of submitting the case to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
On her first appeal, appellant sought an opinion finding 
respondent liable as a matter of law. This time, she restates 
that request. The additional evidence from the second trial 
has tightened the case so that such determination can now 
more readily be made. 
It is unusual to have two juries go down the same, wrong, 
fork in the road, but then each received the same, wrong, 
directions. 
The parties have all suffered four years of cost and un-
certainty. 
Appellant asks the Supreme Court to remand for trial on 
as few issues as possible. 
In some cases, the court on appeal makes specific findings 
covering liability, as recently done in Hahn Inc. v. Armco 
Steel, (Utah, September, 1979}. To end this case, appellant 
proposes she would accept a judicial determination and direc-
tive that both defendants are 50% at fault and if that be 
rejected by respondent, new trial solely to apportion liabi-
lity between defendants. 
DATED May 9, 1980. 
SAMUEL KING 
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